the positive response of comic amusement), and comic immoralism (the immorality of a joke makes it funnier) and argues for a moderate comic moralism. After rejecting the amoralist’s claim ("because humor can be and sometimes is evil") and both the immoralist’s and the ethicist’s assertions, he opts for the view that “sometimes an attempt at humour may be less amusing or even altogether unamusing if it mandates audiences to endorse noxious ethical beliefs, emotions, and attitudes” (p. 116).

Humor scholars, newcomers to the field as well as regular persons who enjoy or create humor, will benefit from Carroll’s lifelong engagement with art as he harnesses his erudition and easy style to enlighten the still vexing problem of humor. The result is an original book which could also serve as a textbook for a course on humor. This is a remarkable achievement given the constraints of a series of very short introductions. But true artistry excels in constraints.

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It has been scientifically proven that Stevie Wonder’s “Superstition” is one of the grooviest songs ever written. In a study on groove and movement, Petr Janata and colleagues had participants rate 148 songs as to their grooviness, and “Superstition” was the clear winner (P. Janata, S. T. Tomic, and J. M. Haberman, “Sensorimotor Coupling in Music and the Psychology of the Groove,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 141(1), 2012, pp. 54–75). Janata and his colleagues operationally defined groove as “the urge to move in response to music, combined with the positive affect associated with the coupling of sensory and motor processes while engaging with music” (p. 54). Note that Janata et al. remain agnostic as to what “groove” actually is; they do not, for example, analyze the most and least groovy songs in their survey to determine the structural requirements for grooviness. Rather, they focus on what groove does—in other words, the proof of grooviness is in the dancing.

Tiger Roholt takes a similar approach to groove, as he emphasizes that groove is “the feel of a rhythm” (p. 1), a feeling that only arises through our embodied engagement with music. Roholt notes there are two aspects to groove, “the music (what the musician does to create a groove) and the felt dimension of the listener’s experience (a leaning feel, a pushing, a pulling, etc.)” (p. 133). Roholt unpacks these aspects over four chapters, on Musical Nuance, Perceiving, The Body, and Groove in Music, respectively. His argument, roughly, proceeds as follows: (a) groove is a kind of musical nuance; (b) nuances create perceptual problems; (c) embodied perception of solves those problems, at least for groove; and (d) groove can thus be defined as a kinematic feeling arising from one’s embodied experience of music. Roholt also insists that in order to have this experience one must actually move; one cannot grasp a groove by simply sitting and listening. For Roholt’s further claim is that neither the analysis nor aesthetic considerations of a musical rhythm (its expressive properties, its value, judgments of a performer’s skill in making a groove, etc.) can properly be made from considerations of the musical facts alone. That is, while analyses of minute differences in rhythmic timing among musicians or rhythmic discrimination among listeners will give us some insight into human rhythmic capacities, they are not sufficient for a full account of groove, for groove is essentially grasped in the affective experience of our movement, movement that is not merely a reaction to a rhythmic “stimulus,” but that is our volitional engagement with music.

Roholt’s first chapter, on musical nuance, begins with an exegesis of the recording sessions that produced the Beatles’ first hit, “Love Me Do.” In these sessions three drummers were used: Pete Best, Ringo Starr, and Andy White. Best was not up to the job and was dismissed from the band as a result. Starr joined the group for the second session, but producer George Martin was still unsatisfied with the drum track, and so he hired a session musician (White) for a third session. White’s track, with Starr on a tambourine, was placed on the Beatles’ first LP, and it is the version now most commonly heard. As Roholt’s detailed analysis shows, Starr and White both play the same pattern on the drums; the difference is how they play it—in other words, the difference is in their respective grooves (aside: Roholt’s analysis is mostly right, but there are a few differences between White and Starr in the kick drum parts, especially at the ends of phrases). Roholt notes that an essential aspect of groove is the performance of a note or drumbeat “slightly early” or “slightly late” (p. 20); Starr and White are “slightly early” and “slightly late” in different ways and hence produced different grooves. Their different grooves stem from differences in timing nuance; groove is thus a species of musical nuance.

Roholt then engages with discussions of musical nuance and ineffability, most notably those of Diana Raffman (Language, Music, and Mind, The MIT Press, 1993). Roholt argues that, contra Raffman, groove-related nuances are made effable through our bodily awareness of their distinct motional qualities (pp. 27–35). Thus while we may not be able to describe timing nuances directly, as in “I hear
the second note of the kick-drum in bar 12 arriving 26 milliseconds late,” we nonetheless can and do account for them indirectly through our awareness and descriptions of the way they (bodily) feel, as notes that “push” or “pull” against the established rhythmic flow.

Roholt’s second chapter is an extended critique of non-embodied analytical accounts of musical rhythm. Here he claims that rhythmic analysis or empirical investigations into the nuts and bolts of microtiming cannot reveal the essential qualities of groove, as this mode of perception forestalls a holistic and bodily engagement with groove; if you are attending to the precise extent to which a given note is early or late, you are not grasping the motional qualities of the rhythmic gestalt—you no longer feel the groove. Moreover, by shifting our focus to those elements of a rhythmic performance, we alter the very object of our attention. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes, Routledge, 2012), Roholt introduces the notion of indeterminacy into our experience of rhythmic nuance “the feel of a groove . . . will not arise in perceptual experience unless the timing variations are perceived indeterminately” (p. 65).

It is not clear to me why Roholt needs to appeal to indeterminacy in making the case that groove is a particular kind of performance nuance that is grasped via our bodily engagement with it. While we cannot determine the precise material basis for distinguishing Groove X from Groove Y, as that mode of presentation (e.g., Groove X has a long-short rhythm that averages 310:276 milliseconds, while Groove Y averages 321:265 milliseconds) is aurally unavailable to us, this does not forestall our ability to make determinate perceptions under other modes of presentation. For if I am aware of the extent to which a groove is pushing or pulling (it can be pushing a little or a lot, violently and jerkily, or steadily and so forth), then my sense of that groove/nuance can be fairly determinate and hence effable.

In his third chapter Roholt moves closer to his account of an engaged perception/experience of groove, one which requires actual, overt bodily movement. In noting the various movements performers make in producing rhythms, Roholt distinguishes those that are necessary for producing sounds (e.g., the striking movement of a drumstick) versus those that are made which do not directly lead to the production of sounds—bodily swaying, head motions, incidental motion of the arms, and so forth. These ancillary movements help the musicians hear and grasp the rhythm, and so too do listeners move, not simply in response to what they hear, but also in order to better grasp what they hear. Our groove-related motor intentionality/activity is not (merely) a reaction or response to the rhythms of the music but our active way of exploring and engaging with the music; it is a way of situating ourselves to grasp the groove. Both performers’ and listeners’ movements are examples of Merleau-Ponty’s “motor intentionality,” that is, bodily activity directed toward things in the world. Roholt claims that this motor intentionality is a “precognitive level at which our bodies situates us in our environments [and] is the level at which we engage with (perceive, experience, understand) grooves—we do not primarily engage with grooves in terms of mental representations (as a traditional view would maintain)” (p. 97).

In this chapter Roholt also refers to Vijay Iyer’s work on our embodied perception of groove in support of his claims (“Embodied Mind, Situated Cognition, and Expressive Meaning,” Music Perception 19(3), 2002, pp. 387–414), and here I would offer a few additions and a two small correctives. First, Iyer’s work is only one part of the broader picture that is emerging on the embodied cognition of rhythm (e.g., Z. Eitan and R. Granot, “How Music Moves: Musical Parameters and Listener’s Images of Motion,” Music Perception 23(3), 2006, pp. 221–247, and P. Toivainen, G. Luck, and M. Thompson, “Embodied Metre: Hierarchical Eigenmodes in Spontaneous Movement to Music,” Cognitive Processing 10(Suppl. 2), 2009, pp. S325–S327). While Roholt is correct in that our embodied understanding of groove does not involve mental representations for declarative kinds of knowledge, if we view our “ability to groove” as a form of procedural knowledge, akin to riding a bicycle or walking, then we can speak of having mental motor representations, which, while not declarative, can be made explicit through gesture and action. Similarly, while Roholt is right to emphasize the necessity for actual movement in developing these motor representations, he mischaracterizes the aim of many studies which focus on brain activity in motor areas as evidence of embodied rhythmic cognition (e.g., J. L. Chen, V. B. Penhune, and R. J. Zatorre, “Listening to Musical Rhythms Recruits Motor Regions of the Brain,” Cerebral Cortex 18(12), 2008, pp. 2844–2854; J. A. Grahn, “Neuroscientific Investigations of Musical Rhythm: Recent Advances and Future Challenges,” Contemporary Music Review 28(3), 2009, pp. 251–277). These studies show that once we have learned to move to music, we retain an embodied response to such music (i.e., the motor representations noted above). In one particularly lovely study (B. Calvo-Merino, D. E. Glaser, J. Grèzes, R. E. Passingham, and P. Haggard, “Action Observation and Acquired Motor Skills: An fMRI Study with Expert Dancers,” Cerebral Cortex 15(8), 2005, pp. 1243–1249), expert dancers and nondancers looked at and listened to videos of dancers engaging in familiar versus unfamiliar movements. Not only were the motor areas of the
expert dancers more active than those of nondancers, they were more active when the experts observed familiar versus unfamiliar dance styles. Embodiment arises through particular processes of enculturation through movement, and once it is established, it can be present even in the absence of overt movement.

Having argued that groove is species of performance nuance (Chapter 1) and that such nuances are not perceived/properly understood analytically (Chapter 2), but rather are grasped through our bodily engagement (Chapter 3), in his final chapter Roholt can now state his central claim: “the feel of a groove is the affective dimension of the relevant motor-intentional movements” (p. 105). That is, “When one grasps a groove, the timing variations [that are the particulars of rhythmic nuance] show up in experience as motor-intentional tensions against a norm; the norm is the rhythm’s pulse; the tensions are provided by the timing nuances. ‘Getting’ a groove, ‘grooving,’ or ‘being in the groove’ means that one possesses a non-cognitive, felt, bodily grasp of a performance or recording’s pulse, rhythmic pattern, and various timing nuances” (p. 108). The final cause of our understanding of rhythm and rhythmic nuance is manifest precisely in the way we feel our bodies move/the way we feel when our bodies move along with the music. If one takes terms like “feel” and “affect” here in both the sense of gestural qualities (pushing, pulling, leaning) as well as expressive qualities (heavy, light, gentle, forceful), then Roholt’s approach has particular aesthetic ramifications, as it would seem to commit one to an arousalist view of musical expression, at least in terms of rhythmic expression related to groove. Or to put it another way, Roholt’s account of our bodily reaction to music may provide an account of the mechanisms which underlie and are necessary for an arousalist account of musical expression as well as a rationale as to why one can and should adopt an arousalist position, for one would be hard pressed to claim that music which compelled one to move was not “arousing” to the moving listener.

As Roholt generously cites some of my own work on rhythmic timing and nuance, I hope it will not seem churlish to offer a few more small criticisms. Roholt’s approach is (a) rock music centric and indeed (b) drummer centric. He often slides from groove as a general feel of the timing nuances of a musical performance to the particular timing nuances in the drum kit, against which the other parts play (p. 109). But the other parts have their own groove, and as various timing studies have shown (e.g., R. Polak and J. London, “Timing and Meter in Mande Drumming from Mali,” Music Theory Online 20(1), 2014), groove is a collective endeavor and not the province of any one part. Similarly, Roholt presumes that rock music is special in having grooves in a way that classical and other musics do not (p. 126). But “pushings, leanings, and pullings” are just as central to Baroque dances and Mozart sonatas as they are to Clyde Stubblefield’s drumming. Now it is true that timing nuances are tied to particular performances, particular “performances” (here in scare quotes, as these may be virtual “studio” performances) are captured and conveyed by recordings, and recordings, as Gracyk and Zak have shown, are central to rock and popular music (T. Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock, Duke University Press, 1996; A. Zak III, The Poetics of Rock: Cutting Tracks, Making Records, University of California Press, 2001). But the centrality of recordings for rock music can create a false sense of the distance between it and styles of music in which live performance is more central (e.g., classical music). Competent musicians can replicate performance grooves with great precision, and there are schools and styles of performance that depend on that replication; a great deal of empirical research into performance timing has been done simply to document this fact. From Viennese waltzes in the nineteenth century to Kansas City Swing in the twentieth, to twenty-first century rock bands performing live versions of their recordings, performing musicians of all kinds are able to give listeners repeated opportunities to employ their embodied musical enculturation(s) when they listen (and move).

Finally, Roholt refers to groove nuances as a matter of notes or drumstrokes being “early” or “late” relative to a deadpan performance, such as one might hear from a drum machine (p. 64). As a result, Roholt treats nuance as kind of rhythmic alteration rather than just one of many ways of performing a particular rhythmic pattern. Many, if not most, studies of performance microtiming do not describe timings in terms of earliness or lateness relative to a perfectly isochronous temporal grid but in terms of the timing ratios or milliseconds between events. In my own work, I have argued nuanced rhythmic timing is not a deviation from an isochronous norm—rather, it is the norm (Hearing in Time, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2012). The “normal” flow of a series of beats has certain duration ratios/patterns, which can be sharpened or softened by the performer to create the feelings of pushing or pulling to which Roholt refers. But these are not “early” or “late” per se, but modifications of an existing microtiming profile that has been internalized by enculturated performers and listeners (e.g., B. H. Repp, “The Detectability of Local Deviations from a Typical Expressive Timing Pattern,” Music Perception, 15(3), 1998, pp. 265–289).

These quibbles aside, in his careful exegesis of groove, Roholt has made a strong case for the necessity of enculturated, embodied experience in our understanding of musical rhythm and hence
in our aesthetic appreciation of it. If Kant were listening to Stevie Wonder’s “Superstition” with both aesthetic pleasure and understanding, he would be dancing, for this pleasure and understanding requires the free play of our bodily faculties, which in turn give rise to bodily pleasures which underlie judgments of rhythmic beauty, which is to say, groove.

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In the overview of Understanding Love by Oxford University Press, it says generally of the book that it aims at understanding love through literature and film. But, as Susan Wolf warns in the introduction to the book, if one approaches the material as a philosopher would, looking for clear analysis of the concept replete with necessary and sufficient conditions for love, then one will walk away sorely disappointed. The book represents a heavily interdisciplinary approach through which one can glean invocations for what might count as love or, more often, what ought to count as good, healthy love. The book offers a multiplicity of accounts, wonderfully illustrated through examples from literature and film, some of which serve as foils to ideal love and others that seem to urge us to broaden our folk-psychological concept of it, or at least to not dogmatically demarcate the boundaries of the concept along familiar lines. Rather than philosophical analysis, the book may serve some readers as lending personal understanding of love and loving relationships, their complexities, and a sense of how and why they can go wrong.

My own focus is on the philosophy of emotions, and I have to say that I expected more of the book to focus on the very emotion of love (the affective mental state), even despite Wolf’s warning in the introduction. This is certainly a bias of mine. And with this bias, I could not help but process much of the content through the sieve of my own understanding and background knowledge. Within the philosophy of emotions, there are some theorists that include specific behaviors (or at least dispositions to such behavior) as a part of the definition of specific emotions, and many of the accounts in Understanding Love deal with understanding love and relationships in terms of behavior (both good and bad). Furthermore, many theorists working within the philosophy and psychology of emotions contend that affective states, while possibly encouraging particular behaviors, certainly must impart information upon the subject. That is to say, emotions carry content (even if only bare content). This facet of the field certainly illuminated my own reading of the book under review. Many of the theorists in the book noted the way in which love can often misrepresent the world, and they discuss the ways in which this can possibly be damaging (or at least serve as a mark of less-than-ideal love). I will make note of several of these authors’ enlightened observations below.

Granting that the book is not meant to serve as a robust philosophical analysis of the concept of love, I nevertheless found the focus of some of the contributions to only superficially be related to love in that the literary or film criticism they offer about particular works could just as well have been presented using some other theme. In this way, while Understanding Love is meant to present love and loving relationships as its central focus, with a few notable exceptions, love only plays second fiddle to a more central philosophical question or to literary and film criticism (perhaps the more apt metaphor is say that love is only a side plot, existing merely as a supporting role in many of the essays and appears only as an extra in others).

The seventeen essays that comprise the book are not organized in any particular way and are rather presented in alphabetical order. The contributors represent a wide range of specialties, including philosophy, art, film, cultural studies, political science, English, literary criticism, and American Studies (and any mix of these, which fully reveals the highly interdisciplinary nature of the project). The book is the product of a grant from the Mellon Foundation and contains papers presented and discussed at a series of workshops. The resultant collection need not be read in any particular order or even as a whole. The essays do inform each other but are also coherent and self-supporting in isolation. Given space constraints, I will touch on only a few of the many contributions.

In the first article of the book, Macalester Bell questions the notion that all of our relationships with animals are tainted by sentimentality. She aims to cast doubt on this notion, which she sees as the forceful thesis of Werner Herzog’s 2005 documentary Grizzly Man. Bell first offers us an understanding of what might count as sentimental by contradistinguishing it from other forms of affection upon which relationships can be based. Sentimental affection is the sort of affection that one has without knowledge, whereas true, loving affection requires knowledge of the beloved. Now, while Bell wishes to clarify what is meant by ‘sentimental affection,’ she admits that there is no distinct affective response necessarily tied with sentimentality. Instead of gerrymandering the sentimental along the lines of a family resemblance of