

Reviewed by Justin London

While we music theorists often turn to other disciplines (such as psychology, cognitive science, mathematics, literary criticism, and so forth) in order to enrich our discourse, it has been rare to find scholars in other disciplines reciprocating the favor. The books considered in this review are two such rarities. In *Language, Music, and Mind* Diana Raffman turns to music theory and studies of musical cognition in order to advance her thesis regarding ineffable aspects of our consciousness and knowledge. And in *The Fine Art of Repetition* Peter Kivy uses a variety of both music-theoretical and philosophical sources in his discussion of a wide range of topics in musical aesthetics.

*Language, Music, and Mind* is an expansion and compilation of several previous articles, organized into three sections.\(^1\) The first two chapters introduce the problem of ineffability in general and musical ineffability in particular. The second chapter, “A Cognitivist Theory of Musical Perce$$\text{...}$$

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\(^2\)Chapters 3 through 5 address the phenomenon of musical nuances, specifically, pitch nuances and their ineffability. The last two chapters are the philosophical payoff of the first five. In chapter 6 Raffman addresses some issues of ineffability proposed by Nelson Goodman in his *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), and in chapter 7 she critiques some issues in the philosophy of mind and theories of consciousness raised by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland.\(^3\)

To begin, Raffman notes that “one of the most deeply rooted convictions in modern aesthetics [is that] our knowledge of artworks is, in some essential respect, ineffable. In apprehending a work of art, we come to know something we cannot put into words” (p. 2). Raffman posits that there are three possible ways in which our knowledge of a musical artwork may be ineffable. The first way she calls *structural ineffability*, which results from “limitations on the listener’s access to his underlying representations of musical structure” (4). In other words, though I may have heard some music, and even if I can remember it in great detail, there may be...

parts of my concurrent experience and/or stored memory which I cannot access. The second type, *feeling ineffability*, “derives from the sensory-perceptual or ‘felt’ character of musical knowledge,” based upon the assumption that “musical knowledge requires (actual, occurrent) sense-perception of musical stimuli at some point in its etiology and is to that extent ineffable: it cannot be communicated entirely by language” (4). The third type, and the type to which she devotes her attention, is *nuance ineffability*: “It turns out that certain features of the music, often called nuances, are likely to be recovered so early in the representational process that they fail to be mentally categorized or type-identified in the manner thought necessary for verbal report. As a result, the listener is consciously aware of the nuances but cannot say which nuances they are. Therein lies their *nuance ineffability*” (4).

Raffman’s argument is as follows. According to current theories of pitch perception, our perception and cognition of musical pitch is categorical. That is, while we are capable of discriminating a vast number of different frequencies within each octave, when we listen in a musical context we don’t hear several hundred distinct pitches, but rather just twelve; we understand all of the myriad frequencies in terms of a small number of tonal categories. Thus, when we hear a sagging leading tone, we hear it as just that, as an out-of-tune version of some pitch—for example, a “‘flat’ F♯”—not as some note that is neither F nor F♯. Raffman calls this species of flat F♯ a *nuance pitch* (or, as Raffman rightly notes, since we perceive intonation on the basis of the tonal interval formed between, for example, the previous E and the flat F♯, we should properly refer to a nuance interval; she uses the term *nuance pitch* as a shorthand for these nuanced intervallic judgments). And because we know that this note is neither F nor F♯, but cannot give any more definite name to it, we cannot put our knowledge of what that note *is* into words; thus, nuance pitches are ineffable. Raffman notes that there are excellent reasons as to why we do not encode (and hence remember) individual nuance intervals/pitches. For if we had an elaborate schema for each nuanced pitch or interval, then “every determinate pitch and interval we can hear would be recognized, and the melody (for one) would vanish in a sea of fine details” (86).

As a clear case of an ineffable perceptual phenomenon, nuance pitches are an interesting datum for arguments concerning the nature of consciousness, knowledge, and the philosophy of mind, as they provide a serious empirical challenge to those philosophers (for instance, Dennett) who would simply deny the presence of any ineffable knowledge whatsoever (that is, if one has knowledge of something it must be, by definition, effable). However, many readers may be quick to point out a problem in Raffman’s thesis, namely, that to many trained musicians nuance pitches are not ineffable at all. Imagine that we have two “pitch experts” (seasoned high-school band directors, let us say, both with perfect pitch), one reporting a pitch to the other. If the first says to the second “that was an F♯ that is five cents flat,” it would seem that the second would know what that note sounds like, even without hearing the pitch played. Thus, expert #1, through a verbal report, is able to get expert #2 to hear the nuanced pitch in the mind’s ear. By definition, this report makes the nuanced pitch effable. Raffman’s thesis regarding ineffability is dependent upon the psychological studies and their empirical data regarding categorical perception of musical pitch. Yet just because the subjects of such studies (often untrained or otherwise “naive” subjects) are incapable of verbally reporting nuance pitches, it does not follow that nuance pitches are inherently ineffable.

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4Raffman is aware of the limitations of current studies in musical perception, for instance, problems of oversimplified stimuli, limitations on subject populations, and so on. See her remarks on p. 64.
What our band directors seem to be able to do is to fine-tune their pitch and interval categories in order to use them as a basis for report. The nuanced F# is made effable by virtue of a specified relationship (five cents negative deviation) from some categorically-fixed reference (for example, an F# within the context of an equal-tempered chromatic scale generated from an A-440; one could, of course, use other tuning systems and reference pitches). The band directors do not uniquely type-identify the nuanced pitch, but they can (on the basis of their innate cognitive gifts and their musical training) index various nuanced “versions” of a pitch/interval in relation to some nonunique type. Of course, at some level, the discrimination ability of our band directors would fail and even they would be unable to articulate the difference between, for example, an A♭ (1760 hz) and an A♮ (1764 hz). This is where things get interesting, for the question now becomes “would they, in a musical context, be able to tell that these two A♭s were two different pitches?” If the answer is yes, then Raffman’s thesis still holds (there are ineffable nuances pitches), and her challenge to Dennett may press forward. But if our band directors are unable to distinguish between these two pitches, then her argument founders, for then we would say that the full content of their musical knowledge (at least with respect to pitch) is effable.

Raffman’s basic argument either succeeds or fails on her unabashed nominalism: to be effable is to be uniquely type-identified (in this way she allies herself with Nelson Goodman—see her chapter 6). If this is so, then it may be argued that ineffability is inherent in any species of categorical perception, whether it is of pitch, color, duration, and so on. That is, as we are aware that our perceptions are categorical (for instance, “that is red”) and as we are aware that there are variations within each category (“there are a lot of different shades of red”) but cannot remember them precisely because we lack fine enough categories, we will necessarily have ineffable knowledge—we know that at some level our categorical fit is sloppy, but cannot say exactly how. In which case it is simply sufficient for Raffman to show that pitch (interval) perception in music is categorical, and thus she is able to challenge Dennett and others. However, if one considers the possibility that nuanced categories may provide a basis for an exhaustive report of nuanced phenomena, then any empirical demonstration of ineffable knowledge must demonstrate that even with expert reporters, ineffable nuance awareness remains. I suspect that Raffman is correct—that beyond some inherent threshold of discrimination there will still be nuanced pitches of which our band directors are aware, but which they cannot report. In this fashion I am most sympathetic to Raffman’s argument and her method. But it is frustrating for the music theorist to find that where her argument is the thinnest is just where things are, at least music-theoretically, the most interesting.

There are other frustrations for the music theorist reading this book as well. Aside from not fully confronting the constraints on her argument imposed by the limitations of the current state of psychological research, Raffman has not availed herself of other relevant information in the field of music perception. Thus, while she gives a credible summary of some of the current literature on pitch perception (68–79), she has ignored the work being done in rhythmic perception, which would seem to provide stronger evidence for her thesis regarding nuance. Indeed, there is an entire subfield of rhythmic cognition that deals with “expressive variations” in the structure of rhythmic patterns.\(^5\) Nor does Raffman consider

how cross-modal encoding of relevant information might affect her argument. It is well known that changes in tuning, especially in the case of simultaneous pitches, give rise to perceived changes in timbre (for instance, the “stretched octaves” used in piano tuning), and thus we speak of sweet thirds, dark fifths, bright chords, and so on. If nuance information is encoded as differences in timbre, and is reported as such, should one call this information ineffable?

In short, it was my continuing wish that Raffman had made this a longer book, spending more time with the issues she raises in her central chapters. More attention to the limits of current research in pitch perception as well as other relevant work in music theory and music cognition would have bolstered her argument. Her lack of emphasis on these topics is understandable, given that for Raffman music theory and music psychology are but means to her philosophical end. But as she intends her book to be read not only by philosophers, but also by psychologists, linguists, and music theorists (see her remarks on p. 10), it would have been helpful if she had given the various topics in the book, especially her discussion of pitch and interval perception, a less cursory treatment.6

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Peter Kivy’s The Fine Art of Repetition is quite a different book, a collection of previously published articles on music and musical aesthetics from 1959 to the present day. Many readers of Spectrum will be familiar with one or more of Kivy’s books on music.7 With the publication of The Fine Art of Repetition, all of Kivy’s writings on matters musical are now available in convenient book format. In both his books and articles Kivy’s typical strategy is to take the way(s) in which thoughtful and sensitive musicians and musicologists talk about music, interpretation, composition, and performance as a point of departure, and then place these “intuitive” statements into a broader aesthetic context. To this strategy Kivy brings both a thorough knowledge of philosophy and a wide reading of musicology and music theory (it is hard not to like a philosopher who speaks of “Mattheson as a philosopher of Art”—see his chapter 13). Kivy also brings a commanding knowledge of the standard repertoire and, as an accomplished amateur oboist, a firsthand understanding of the problems of musical structure and expression from the performer’s point of view.

In the introduction to The Fine Art of Repetition, Kivy gives a succinct and unflinchingly honest account of the origin and then subsequent history of the reception of each of the articles in the volume. The book as a whole is organized into five sections, plus a prelude. The prelude (“Music and Us”) is a recent article from the Journal of Aesthetic Education (25 [1991]: 79–93), “Music and the Liberal Education.” In the

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first section, “Work and Performance,” Kivy offers a defense of musical Platonism and some thoughts on the concept and problem(s) of musical authenticity. The second section, “The World of Opera,” contains a critique of Cone’s ideas on how operatic characters express themselves (found in Cone’s article “The World of Opera and Its Inhabitants,” reprinted in Music, A View From Delft, ed. Robert P. Morgan [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989]) coupled with a distillation of the philosophy of artistic expression propounded by R. G. Collingwood (in The Principles of Art [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938]). This section also contains two discussions of character delineation in Mozart’s operas, discussions which stemmed from the 1991 Hofstra Mozart Conference. Here published for the first time we have Professor Kivy’s presentation from that conference as well as an initial reply to criticism raised by his copanelists at the conference (see the introduction, p. 3). In the third section, “Music and the History of Ideas,” we find an amalgam of three diverse topics: Mozart’s ear and conceptions of divine temporality; the notion of natural genius and the “Innocent Ear” of the child Mozart; and the discussions of music and its evolutionary role in the writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer(!). In the fourth section, “Music and Emotion,” Kivy discusses theories of emotional expression in absolute music, focusing upon the work of Mattheson, Kant, and Hanslick. And in the fifth and final section, Kivy discusses music alone as “The Fine Art of Repetition,” another essay newly written for this volume. The section concludes with an essay on the question of whether or not music should be regarded as a fine art or as one of the decorative arts.

To confront all, or even most, of the many issues Kivy raises in this book goes well beyond the bounds of this review. But as the last two chapters of the book discuss an issue that is of considerable and particular interest to readers of Spectrum, they demand both a brief summary as well as some brief commentary. The last two chapters are concerned with absolute music; the penultimate discusses music alone (Kivy’s philosophically neutral term for absolute music) as “The Fine Art of Repetition” and the last chapter asks “Is Music an Art?” Kivy begins the penultimate chapter by stating the obvious; he notes that music alone “consists to a large, although of course varying degree, in quite literal repetition of what has been heard before. Indeed, because quite frequently the repetition is literally literal, there is no need for the notes to be written down or printed a second time. So musicians have devised instructions, such as double dots in front of a double bar, or da capo, or dal segno, all of which tell the performer to go back to some designated place in the score or part and simply play the thing over again. Everyone knows this obvious and elementary fact. It is almost embarrassing to point it out. Yet for the most part it remains unremarked and unexplained both by philosophers and by others who write on musical aesthetics in a philosophical vein” (328). What Kivy observes is that the two most popular and the most prestigious theoretical frameworks for musical analysis, by their very nature, tend to run roughshod over musical repetitions and the structures such repetitions create.

Kivy notes that traditional approaches to musical analysis usually involve one of the three general strategies: “Since serious philosophical speculation about the nature of absolute music began to gain momentum in musical and philosophical circles in the second half of the eighteenth century, three basic kinds of models have been proposed: I call them the ‘literary’ model, the ‘organism’ model, and the ‘wallpaper’ model. The literary model can itself be subdivided into at least three clearly discernable varieties: the ‘discourse’ model, which likens music alone to a kind of discursive argument, the ‘dramatic’ model, which likens it a kind of emotive stage play, and the ‘narrative’ model, which likens it to a kind of recited emotive story” (330). It is clear from this quotation what Kivy means by the literary model. The organism model is one which likens the sequence of musical
events in time to patterns of biological growth and development. Kivy notes that these first two models, literary and organism, are the ones which have received the most attention and are the two which confer upon music the highest aesthetic status. The literary model allows music to stand shoulder to shoulder with poetry and drama among the fine arts (more on this in a moment). The organism model achieves its status because “the art that seemed (and may still seem to some) the most powerful metaphor of life [amongst the arts] became (and still remains) a highly valued enterprise” (332). The wallpaper model, alas, comes in a pitiable third—music as sonic patterns, as tonal wallpaper (hence the name). Under the aegis of this model music is no longer a fine art, but merely decorative; as Kivy notes, “All that music alone amounts to . . . is pleasant but empty noise” (333). And yet this is the model which, unlike the literary or organism models, not only acknowledges the presence of repetition, but indeed is dependent upon them. Kivy’s purpose in these last two chapters is thus twofold as he first wishes to critique the literary and organism models and then argue for an enhanced status for the wallpaper model.

Kivy’s critique of the literary model is rather straightforward, in that he asks us to imagine what it would be like to read or watch a play which contained the same sorts of repetitive structures as da capo arias and sonata-allegro movements—we would find a drama absurd if after the first two acts we were presented with a more or less exact repetition of the first act again. As Kivy notes: “Folks don’t do that sort of thing. They don’t repeat verbatim what they have just said a minute after they have said it, which is, essentially, what the da capo aria makes everyone in an opera do for hours on end” (334). To muster his argument Kivy brings in quotations from various debates on opera and drama from the seconda prattica onward, citing Algarotti, Gluck, Grétry, and Wagner, using Wagner’s critique of Beethoven’s Leonore Overture No. 3 as demonstration of an instance where the narrative’s need for a continuing flow of events and the music’s need to repeat (that is, reprise the exposition) are at loggerheads. Kivy then concludes this critique by claiming that, as a result of a need to describe music in terms of a “continuous flow” (Kivy takes these words from Schenker), musicians and philosophers turned from the literary model to the organism model in the nineteenth century.

However, in focusing on the problems with drama and linear narrative, Kivy has excluded other literary models which do not brook repetition—indeed, sizable repetition. The obvious candidate here is the rhetorical model of the classical oration (a model which Kivy knows well, as he has read his Mattheson and Burmeister). It is of course old hat to draw parallels between the three parts of a sonata-allegro movement and the parts of a classical oration, but it is worth noting that the classical oration requires the restatement (often via paraphrase) of large swatches of discourse. Similarly, there are narrative and dramatic forms which often involve a return to starting scenes (but perhaps with romantic pairings reconfigured, or father and son replaced by mother and daughter, and so on) in a striking fashion. Some discursive, dramatic, and narrative forms do have repeats. Indeed, upon reflection, Kivy’s commonsense appeal that “folks don’t do that sort of thing” does not quite stand up, for in fact, we do do that sort of thing quite often in conversation—we make a statement, and then after intervening exchange(s) with our interlocutors, we reiterate or paraphrase our opening statement(s). Now of course, the repeats of a da-capo aria are not
like these sorts of repeats in ordinary discourse—we do not, for example, repeat an extended linguistic exchange word-for-word with a group of interlocutors (but then again, an embellished reprise of a da-capo aria, as was standard practice, is no analog for a word-for-word recapitulation either). Kivy’s polestars are those forms whose definition is predicated upon exact repetition—the minuet da capo, the rondo, and so forth. In the context of these movements, Kivy’s critique of narrative and dramatic models would seem fairly robust. But in the case of a sonata-allegro movement or an embellished da-capo aria, where the recapitulation is not an exact repeat, but a paraphrase of the exposition, and with the models for rhetoric clearly extant, it would seem that here the literary model can (at least in some instances) be profitably applied.

Kivy’s critique of the organism model is analogous to his critique of dramatic and narrative models: if the organism model is predicated on the temporal events in a piece of music corresponding to some sort of “life cycle,” then it is absurd to have large stretches of exact repetition—this would be tantamount to going through adolescence twice, or being born several times (in exposition, recapitulation, and coda). You can’t go back again, according to Kivy. This critique is more thorough than his critique of the literary model, especially if we take the organism model to its logical conclusion. If the organism model is a metaphor for the “life-cycle of a piece,” then perhaps we can enrich the metaphor to embrace some large-scale repetition. For there are, of course, repetitive aspects to life—the annual cycle, recurring events such as the birth of children, and so on. Thus the life-cycle of a piece can encompass structural recurrence—musical analogs to birth, growth, and then rebirth through one’s offspring. But consider the implications of this metaphorical extension, that is, that after birth and maturation comes the bearing of new seeds. Such extension does not respect the integrity of the work as a whole, for structural recurrences (such as sonata-form recapitulations) would, under the rubric of “offspring,” no longer be part of the same piece, but be the start of another. This is of course an untenable analytical position.10

Kivy sums up the situation vis-à-vis the literary and organism models this way: “Music is what it is, repeats and all. The literary and organism models are what they are: “process” models that do not allow of their doubling back on themselves. Either these models must be given up, or the musical repeat must somehow come to be understood in a way that makes it compatible with them” (338–39). Kivy is aware that this very tactic—a reinterpretation of the musical repeat—has been used in order to maintain the organic and/or literary models. Kivy considers Edward Cone’s position, outlined in Musical Form and Musical Performance (New York: Norton, 1968), that “there is no such thing as true redundancy in music” (cited in Kivy, 340). According to Cone, there never really is any literal repetition in music because the context in which any musical unit is presented is always different: that is, if I hear x and then x again (call this x2), x2 is different precisely because it is preceded by x; similarly an x3 would differ from x2 because it is preceded by both x and x2, and so forth. This will be a familiar argument to many readers.

Kivy counters this assertion by using the familiar philosophical distinction between types and tokens. He claims that in denying that music contains any true redundancy, Cone must therefore deny that literal repeats are type-identical, that is, each repeat of some motive x is a token of the x-type.

10I would note that there are a few pieces in which a “return to the seed” notion does seem warranted, such as the first movement of Bartók’s Music for Strings, Percussion, and Celesta. Here the contrapuntal motive unfolds as the movement begins and then refolds back into itself as the movement ends—if anything is a returning to an initial compositional germ, this is it. But of course, most repetitions and recapitulations are utterly unlike this example from Bartók, which is precisely the point.
Kivy does not disagree with Cone that “the intentional objects that result from the type-identical repeats of the physical sounds are . . . in important respects different from one another,” but he then goes on to ask, “Does the fact, which one must grant, that the intentional objects are in important respects different imply that they are tokens of different types?” (341). Kivy says they are not, and indeed, cannot be so, because “it is just because they are heard as tokens of the same type that they can, one would presume, have the aesthetic effect . . . of being the same except for their relationships to what they precede and what they succeed” (341). Thus if we really wish to deny that there are ever literal repeats in music, we would have to say that \( x, x_1, x_2 \), and so on, are all tokens of different musical types, which is absurd. To try to hold to Cone’s claim would be to disunify radically the motivic structure of just about every piece of music.

The upshot of all this is that, contra Cone, there really is literal repetition in music, and that one cannot easily fit such repetition, especially large-scale repetition, into formal models patterned after biological or literary structures. What is left, then, is . . . tonal wallpaper. As noted earlier, Kivy’s second purpose in these essays is to push for the enhanced status of this model, and, in a nutshell, if music is merely a decorative art (rather than a fine art), then so be it. And this is what the philosophical fuss is really all about. In the final chapter of the book, Kivy reminds us that the classification of the “Fine Arts” in general (and music in particular as one of the fine arts) is a fairly recent phenomenon. According to Batteux, the fine arts—Painting, Sculpture, Dance, Music, and Poetry—are mimetic; all imitations of nature. Kivy then places Batteux’s work in its music-historical context, and notes that prior to the nineteenth century, Music-with-a-capital-M (and hence that music which would be considered Art-with-a-capital-A) was not instrumental music, but vocal music. Kivy notes that vocal music had undergone a profound change in the seventeenth century, for in that era “[m]usic ha[d] been transformed from the decorative craft of text-setting into the fine art of utterance-representation” (365). Thus when Batteux spoke of musical imitation, it was assumed that this was vocal music, vocal music which imitated the expressive capacities of the human voice itself. Music was thus safely a representational art, and thus could be included within the scheme of the other fine arts.

Then came music alone, which is of course not inherently mimetic, and this produced a conundrum for aestheticians. For if we demand that the Fine Arts be representational, then Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony cannot be Fine Art, which is practically the same thing as saying that Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is not Art at all. Clearly, we don’t want to do that. Kivy posits that this conundrum is really a pseudoproblem, a product of the assumptions regarding what defines Art-with-a-capital-A that we have inherited from Batteux. As a way out of this conundrum Kivy suggests instead that “since the end of the sixteenth century there have been two arts of music, the fine art of musical text setting, which is basically the art of representing human expression in musical tones, and the decorative art of absolute music. Recognizing this simple fact frees us from the impossible philosophical task of finding a theory or some other kind of conceptual analysis that can enable us to understand absolute music as one of the fine arts” (371).

It then follows that we must recognize that the fine arts and the decorative arts each have equal aesthetic potential. For if music alone is sonic wallpaper, then what magnificent wallpaper it is. Music must therefore sit at the pinnacle of the decorative arts, and musical masterworks demonstrate the richly expressive possibilities of the decorative media. Kivy concludes with a number of reasons as to how music achieves this preeminent and sublime status: (1) musical patterns are

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multidimensional—they are intricate and complex in ways in which friezes and Persian carpets can only begin to approach; (2) music is a “quasi-syntactic pattern” (355)—tonal music (at least) has a grammar by which patterns are judged as not merely well formed or malformed, but appropriate to a particular musical context; (3) musical patterns are highly expressive—music “possesses emotive properties as part of its perceived structure . . . in virtue of possessing them as heard musical properties, indeed properties that are part of musical ‘syntax’ and structure” (356–57); and finally (4) music alone is deeply moving—not by virtue of stimulation of garden-variety emotions like fear or sadness, but by stirring deeper feelings of aesthetic appreciation and awe.

Kivy’s essays are about values—what aspects of musical structure we value in terms of their structural importance versus what aspects we feel are not as important. Music theories are not created in an aesthetic vacuum, and thus it is unsurprising that the theories of musical structure which arose over the past two centuries strove to be consonant with arguments which place music among the fine arts. In many ways we all tend to be like Cone—we are uneasy with “mere repetition,” and thus we tend to give accounts of musical form which look to underlying processes or paradigms, of which surface repetitions are but an elaboration. Kivy challenges us to imagine a theory of musical structure wherein repetition is not an elaboration of an underlying form, but an essence of the form itself, as well as to consider the aesthetic values which underpin our theoretical assumptions and suppositions.

The essays in The Fine Art of Repetition need not be read in any particular sequence, though some refer to Kivy’s other books as well as relevant work of other philosophers. This volume may be profitably used in a number of music courses in both theory and history, and not the least reason for doing so is that these essays are wonderful examples of good writing about music and musical structure.12 When necessary, Kivy is more than willing to get into the analytical trenches, but he knows also when to paint with a broader brush. There are many fine turns of phrase which brought a smile and even laughter to this reviewer (and how often can we say that about a serious theoretical text?!). Finally, the prelude article “Music and the Liberal Education” simply should be required reading of anyone who teaches (or who would teach) music theory and/or music history at the college level. In short, The Fine Art of Repetition is a most welcome addition to our bookshelves; it is that wonderful rare work that will be a boon both to our teaching as well as to our scholarly work, a wellspring of thought that readers will want to read and reread not only for the challenges it raises, but also for the sheer pleasure of its eloquence.

12There are a few quibbles regarding Kivy’s text. In assembling this volume notes and other bibliographic references were not updated, and thus, for example, in chapter 13 we have references to The Corded Shell and not its subsequent reissue. Also, where applicable the notes refer to other chapters in terms of the pagination used in their original publications, rather than the current volume, which is confusing to the reader.